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The companion to THREAT-MODEL.md: for each thing that can go wrong, the signal that shows it, the threshold that fires, and what the operator does next. Status. This is the plan, written now so the Tranche 2 deliverable is an implementation rather than a discovery exercise. What exists today is marked ✅; what does not is marked ⬜ and is funded work, not a claim. Tranche 2 makes every row below live against testnet with alerts demonstrated firing on simulated anomalies; Tranche 3 runs the same plan against mainnet with a public status page.

What is watched

Settlement path

Baseline for these thresholds is measured, not guessed: today’s single-fee-payer configuration settles a lone payment in ~7s and collapses to a 10% success rate at 10-way concurrency. Post-pool numbers replace these.

Fee sponsorship — the drain surface

Catalog integrity

Discovery quality

Conformance

RPC dependency

Alert routing

One severity split, because a solo maintainer with five severities has one severity.
  • Page (immediate): fee-payer runway < 7 days, settlement success < 95%, store unreachable, conformance failure.
  • Ticket (next working session): everything else.
Every alert links to the runbook section for its signal. The runbook is a Tranche 3 deliverable and covers, at minimum: fee-payer top-up, key rotation, channel-pool reconciliation, store failover, and rollback.

What gets published

The Tranche 3 public status page shows settlement success rate, settlement latency p50/p95, catalog size, discovery latency and rolling 30-day uptime against the 99% target — with the SLO’s exclusions stated (planned maintenance, upstream Stellar/RPC outages), because an availability number without its exclusions is marketing.

Deliberately not monitored

  • Per-payer behavioural profiling. The catalog is public infrastructure; building a behavioural dossier on the agents that use it is not in scope.
  • Content moderation of listings. Integrity validation is mechanical (traversal, SSRF, length, encoding). Judging what a service is would make the facilitator an arbiter of what may be sold, which is the opposite of permissionless.